Multisensory Perception in Philosophy by Ross, Amber & Matthen, Mohan
Multisensory Research 34 (2021) 219–231 brill.com/msr
Introduction to the Special Issue on Multisensory
Perception in Philosophy
Amber Ross 1 and Mohan Matthen 2,∗
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, 330 Griffin-Floyd Hall, Gainesville, FL
32611-8545, USA
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Maanjiwe nendamowinan (Rm. 6138),
3359 Mississauga Rd., Mississauga, ON L5L 1C6, Canada
European philosophers of the modern period generally acknowledged that the
senses are our primary source of knowledge about the contingent states of the
world around us. The question of modality was of secondary interest and was
very little discussed in this period. Why? Because these philosophers were
atomists about sense-perception, an attitude that makes multisensory percep-
tion impossible. Let us explain.
Atomists hold that all sense-experience is of ‘ideas’ — a somewhat over-
simple, but still useful, way to think of these is as images. All ideas are
ultimately composed of simple ideas. Atomists hold, moreover, that the intrin-
sic nature of a simple (or non-composite) idea is fully given by conscious
experience of that idea, and in no other way. For example, burnt sienna is a
simple idea because it is not composed of other ideas. Nothing about its intrin-
sic nature can be known except by experiencing it — a colour-blind individual
cannot know what it is. It is, moreover, adequately and completely known
when it is experienced; there is nothing more to know about it than is given by
visual experience of it (see Note 1).
Now, on this account of simple ideas, distinctions among them cannot
be analysed. For atomists, inter-modal distinctions, like all other distinctions
among ideas, are primitive and based in experience. What, for example, is
the difference between burnt sienna and the sound of a trumpet playing mid-
dle C? All that can be said is that they are experientially different from one
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another in a way similar to how Oxford blue and the sound of a flute play-
ing middle D are different from one another. But since this difference is just
a brute fact about experience, one cannot do much more than simply label it.
Sensory atomists do not think that modality explains the nature of the colours
or explains the difference between colours and sounds. Rather, modality is
for them a grouping based on experienced similarity. Like colour, visuality
is, for them, a similarity-based abstract feature that we find in the content of
sense-perception — a ‘determinable,’ to use the terminology of W. E. Johnson
(1921).
Atomists allow, of course, that we have empirical knowledge of the causal
origin of these differences — almost everybody knows, for example, that
visual ideas come from the use of the eyes and auditory ones from the ears.
But such facts are not contained in the experiences themselves. For, as atomists
insist, it’s logically possible that the idea of a trumpet playing middle C could
have come from the eyes. Such origin-facts must be empirically ascertained —
we come to know this in part by covering our ears and noting the diminution
in volume. This adds nothing to our knowledge of the intrinsic natures of these
ideas, atomists insist. For reasons like this, the atomist paradigm doesn’t admit
the theoretical interest of facts about the modal source of simple ideas. Modal-
ity is of no more than taxonomical interest to the atomist. It does not explain
phenomenology; it is phenomenology.
Because of this atomistic attitude, European philosophers of the modern era
(i.e., from Descartes to the end of the twentieth century) have almost nothing
of interest to say about sense-modality. We find the single important exception
to this generalization is Molyneux’s Question, which has to do with whether
the modalities intersect. Take this idea of the tactual type. Could it also be of
the visual type?
Here’s how this famous incident went. In 1688, William Molyneux, an Irish
physician and mathematician, wrote to John Locke to ask whether a newly
sighted man would be able to distinguish a globe and a cube by vision alone.
Could he, in other words, distinguish and identify shapes he already knew
by touch using only his newfound sensory capacity. The question turns on
whether visual experiences of the two solids reveal the same differences that
visual experiences do. An atomist is committed to saying that if these shapes
are simple ideas, there is no way of comparing the visual impression of shape
with that provided by touch — the experiences are different, and so the ideas
are as well. It was assumed, perhaps on this tacit assumption, that the answer
must be negative.
This initial response to Molyneux’s Question assumes, however, that shape
is a simple idea. But are they? Globes and cubes are spatially extended. Might
they not be structured out of point-impressions? And might the structure not
be the same in both senses? Following up on this possibility, Molyneux’s
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Question led to much productive debate about whether there are differences
of structure between the two shapes that would give the game away to a newly
sighted man. For example, would the newly sighted man be able to discern
the greater symmetry of the visual sphere and thus match it up with his touch-
based idea? This said, Molyneux’s Question seems to leave sensory atomism
intact, diverting the debate about inter-modal comparisons to the arena of com-
posite qualities.
Putting the ingenuity of Molyneux’s Question aside, the atomistic program
served as an effective means of shutting down philosophical discussion of mul-
timodal perception. Take an example that sensory scientists have found partic-
ularly revealing — the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). Here,
a video of a person speaking the syllable /ga/ is dubbed with a soundtrack
of somebody speaking the syllable /ba/. Subjects listening to the soundtrack
with the video turned on generally report that they hear some visually and
auditorily intermediate syllable: for example, /da/. But when they close their
eyes, or when the video is switched off, these same subjects accurately hear
the phoneme in the sound-track — /ba/. (If the audio track is switched off,
no determinate phoneme is perceived — vision alone is insufficient for speech
recognition in such short snippets, even for experienced lip-readers.) The alter-
nation between /ba/ and /da/ is caused by the video-track being switched on
and off.
It is natural to take this effect to show that our perception of phonemes
integrates sensory inputs from vision and audition. We seem to hear a syllable
/da/. But sometimes when we do, what we see is partly responsible. Most
speech scientists think that this confirms something that has long been known
about speech perception in everyday situations: namely, that when we engage
in conversation in noisy environments, we are helped by many non-auditory
contextual cues. Vision is among these (Sumby and Pollock, 1954). So, as we
now know, is the sense of touch: Gick and Derrick (2009) found that inaudible
puffs of air applied to a subject’s skin caused her to hear phonemes as more
aspirated, thus transforming /b-/ into /p-/, for example. Thus, most conclude,
speech perception is multisensory.
Sensory atomists think that whatever the other merits of this finding, it tells
us nothing about the intrinsic character of speech sounds. For them, if the
experience of hearing /da/in a McGurk video is the same as that of hearing an
environmentally authentic utterance, then the two phonetic ideas are the same.
And if they are the same, it must be a mistake to hold that the source of the
input makes a difference to phonemes. Yes, /da/ can be produced in different
ways, but since the consciously apprehended idea is the same, and moreover
simple, its modality, understood as an intrinsic experienced feature, cannot
be sometimes this, sometimes another. On this reasoning, /da/ is auditory no
matter how it is produced — it is experienced in the auditory manner.
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One might have thought that this disagreement between scientists and philo-
sophical friends of sensory atomism would be an embarrassment to the latter.
But in the scientifically blinkered world of mid-twentieth century linguis-
tic/analytic philosophy, the conflict did not cause any lack of ease. The atom-
ist’s conclusion is reiterated by most important, indeed the only, original work
on sense-modality in this period — H. P. Grice’s (1962) ‘Some Remarks on
the Senses.’ In this influential paper, Grice considers an imaginary creature
that possesses two pairs of eyes, each ‘more or less like our eyes,’ and each
used, as our eyes are, to experience colour, size, and shape. Despite these sim-
ilarities, the creature experiences the same properties differently — when it
experiences blue through one set of eyes, for example, it has a different expe-
rience than when it experiences it through the other. Grice argues that in such
a case — and in our own case, by extension — the correct way to demarcate
a modality is by how things are experienced — or, as he puts it, ‘the way to
describe our visual experiences is in terms of how things look to us.’ This rein-
forces the atomist premise — though the creature experiences colour through
similar sense-organs, it is experiencing different simple ideas. (In a way, the
creature is like Molyneux’s newly sighted man, experiencing through one pair
of eyes the same properties as it does with the other — but experiencing them
differently.) So, the nature of the sense-organ is not relevant to the nature of
the quality experienced through it.
Come back now to the McGurk effect. For atomists, speech perception is
unimodal-auditory because it is of the same sort as we experience when we
hear speech. It does not seem to us that we see it or see-and-hear it. Ulti-
mately, the quality of experience is what matters. So, since we experience the
phonemes as if they are simple auditory qualities, they are auditory qualities.
And here ‘auditory quality’ does not mean the same as ‘quality that the ears are
sensitive to.’ Rather, it means ‘quality that is experienced in the same manner
as other qualities labelled auditory.’ And that is the end of the matter, at least
as far as sensory atomism goes. (Grice actually considers a case structurally
somewhat similar to the McGurk effect, in which a perceiver to whom ‘two
coins look equal in size when only seen, feel equal in size when only felt, but
look unequal and feel equal when both seen and felt.’ He does not consider the
possibility of cross-modal interaction as a possibility for resolving the case.)
Sensory atomism shuts down the discussion of multisensory perception,
and for this reason, the question of the sense-modalities is very little discussed
in the modern period in European and English-speaking philosophy. In older
times, however, the question was regarded as more interesting. Thus, both in
ancient Greece and in India, the five external senses are a staple of the discus-
sion of perception.
Philosophers in ancient Greece violated the methodology of sensory atom-
ism by discussing the causal process of perception, which, according to them
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is modality-specific. Aristotle, in particular, offered a detailed account of what
he took to be the causal sequence originating in an external object, continuing
through an intervening medium, and culminating in a perceptual act. Aristotle
held that a sensory quality is one that ‘actualizes’ a sense organ by transmitting
its ‘sensory form’ through a specific medium. For example, the colour, orange,
is a quality that actualizes the eye’s capacity to sense orange by imparting its
‘sensory form’ to the sensitive part of the eye. It does this by first acting on
‘the transparent’ — a medium that occupies the space between the object and
the eye. Without going into details about this process — see Matthen 2019 for
a more detailed account and discussion — it is meant to be modality-specific.
The five external modalities are distinguished from one another both by the
medium specific to them and by the qualities that are able to act on them
through the medium.
In Aristotle’s model, however, there is an additional problem that leads to
a consideration of the possibility of multimodal perception. Since a sensible
object makes the eye like itself, and since the act of perception must ostensibly
identify a particular object, it seems impossible to perceive two distinct objects
simultaneously. For if one object makes the eye orange, and this state of the
eye constitutes a representation of this object being orange, then the eye is
thereby rendered incapable of representing another object being any colour —
its representational capacity is exhausted by the first object and its colour.
Aristotle attempts to address this problem in de Sensibus 7 by proposing, as
Pavel Gregoric (2007, 133) writes, that acts of perception must be ‘complex
enough to grasp both objects,’ yet ‘sufficiently unified to produce a single act
of simultaneous perception.’
A similar problem is articulated in Gautama’s Nyaya-sutras (a work that
is at least 1900 years old, though it could antedate Aristotle), which defines
perception as ‘cognition that arises from the contact of the sense organ and
object.’ Gautama, like Aristotle, assumes a pairing of sense-organs and their
objects. He does not, however, mention the medium as something that differ-
entiates the modalities. (See Monima Chadda, 2010, for more information on
Indian theories of perception.)
These more accommodating conceptions of perception raise interesting
questions for which sensory atomists have no room. Consider once again how
we know that burnt sienna is different from the trumpet’s middle C? Clearly
not by either sight or hearing, since neither modality is able to entertain both
simultaneously. Accordingly, Plato, Aristotle, and the Nyaya school all posit
a common faculty that makes inter-modal comparisons — the Greeks posit
a ‘common sense’ and the Indians a mental faculty they call manas. Aristotle
and the Nyaya scholars then ask whether it is possible for this common faculty
simultaneously to entertain ideas from more than one modality. To which, they
answer negatively — the common faculty can access only one modality at a
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time, or in Aristotle’s case, an emergent mixture formed from two modalities
(Gregoric, 2007, 134). Interestingly, this line of thought aligns with Spence
and Bayne (2014), who argue on much the same grounds that ‘consciousness’
is not multisensory.
Consider, in the light of these ancient theorists (and also Spence and Bayne,
2014), the ventriloquist’s illusion. This performer produces speech sounds
with his mouth closed, while simultaneously flapping the mouth of a wooden
dummy that he holds by his side. This produces the irresistible illusion of
the dummy speaking. The explanation usually given is that our perceptual
systems detect a coordination between the visually detected movements of
the dummy’s mouth and the auditorily detected speech sounds actually pro-
duced by the ventriloquist. As a consequence of this coordination, it locates
the sound stream in the mouth of the dummy. Call this audiovisual ‘bind-
ing.’ (Perhaps this act of binding would satisfy Aristotle’s requirement that
simultaneous cross-modal perception demands a mixture.) Now, which sys-
tem performs the binding act? Not vision, say both the Greeks and the Indians
referenced above, because vision cannot hear the speech sounds. Not audition
either, for symmetrical reasons. So, there must be a common faculty that does
the work. The Nyaya philosophers say that this common faculty does its work
by switching rapidly back and forth between visual and auditory experience,
both of which it can access, but not simultaneously. Aristotle considers, but
rejects this solution, at least partially on the grounds that it does not give an
adequate account of musical harmonies. (It is significant that harmony is not
systematized in Indian classical music — it’s at best the product of voice-
leading there.)
We said that these ancient theorists have a more accommodating conception
of modality than the sensory atomists. In what way? And what philosophical
work does their conception do? To answer the first question, let’s ask: what
does the sensory atomist say about the ventriloquist illusion? Just that the voice
seems to come from the dummy’s moving mouth. The manner in which this
illusion is achieved is a contingent fact about our experience, and as such it
is not the philosopher’s concern. This is a narrow-minded conception of the
philosopher’s task, but it is important to note that this is not where the ancient
theorists disagree. For their focus is on the manner in which the coordination
between the voice and the moving mouth is achieved — that is, by a faculty
that is capable of entertaining both auditory and visual experiences. And this
leads them to the second question: What philosophical work is accomplished
thereby? By adopting an empirically substantive thesis about the modalities,
they arrive at more interesting conceptions of multisensory integration than is
available to sensory atomists. Within these conceptions, it is possible to ask
questions like: How can we simultaneously be aware of ideas from different
modalities? In short, they are led to consider questions that are suppressed in
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the classic sensory atomism that dominated philosophy of perception from the
seventeenth century right up to the end of the twentieth.
With these examples of conceptual richness in mind, we will briefly outline
some other philosophical questions that could be raised about sensory atomism
and multisensory perception. It is our contention that however these questions
are answered, they are questions that don’t naturally arise in the context of
orthodox sensory atomism. It is worth unsequestering them, for each leads in
its own way to productive questions about the proper analysis of the sensory
qualities and capacities involved.
Field awareness vs. point awareness Sensory atomists assume that when a
quality seems to be located at a point in the perceptual field, the content of
the sensory state is point-specific. Suppose, for instance, I seem to see red
instantiated in that maple leaf. Then the perceptual content of my visual state
is that the maple leaf is red.
Sensory integration, including multisensory integration, suggests an alter-
native view. Consider the ventriloquist illusion again. Ostensibly, my per-
ceptual state is a purely auditory experience of speech emanating from the
dummy’s mouth. But here’s a plausible analysis of the effect that takes us in a
different direction: my perceptual systems settle on a probable common cause
for two coordinated effects, one visual and the other auditory by co-locating
them in the dummy’s mouth. If this analysis is correct, then one may think it
plausible that the content of my perceptual state is more complex, involving
an integrated amalgam of several inputs from audition and vision.
Coming back to the red of the maple leaf: we know that colour perceived at
a point is the result of a comparative analysis of the entire visual field. (This
is the basis for colour constancy.) In view of this, is it appropriate to deny
that colour vision provides point-located awareness and to hold instead that
it offers (or at least that it incorporates) awareness of the colour distribution
across the entire visual field? And if this is so, what is the mental faculty that
achieves field-integration? Does it have any of the attributes of Aristotelian
‘common sense’ or Nyaya manas?
Temporal Integration We seem to sense qualities at a moment. My experi-
ence at this moment of the world seems to be experience of how the world is
at this moment. But this view has its difficulties when it comes to movement
and change. Movement is defined by some one thing being in different loca-
tions at different times. If what I perceive is only how things are at a moment,
then how do I perceive at a moment that something is moving? The answer
must be that clocked sensory information about the past is incorporated into
our awareness of the present. So, what appears to be visual information about
the present (‘NOW: that car is moving toward me at high velocity’) is actually
multisensory since an internal clock comes into play.
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The (much-discussed) question then is this: how is temporally spread-
out sensory information compressed and presented in perception of a single
moment?
Spatial Integration Through Self-Movement Vision is spatially organized at
the input end — the lens of each eye throws a two-dimensional image on the
retina. The inputs to audition and smell are not spatial: audition separates the
input out into tones, each of which sums up spatially distributed input; smell
similarly analyses it by chemical properties. Yet, we do seem to be able to
locate sounds and smells. How?
One part of the answer lies in the fact that we have two ears and two nostrils,
resulting in small differences in the arrival times of stimuli. This gives infor-
mation about the direction in which stimuli lie relative to us. Another part of
the answer, and perhaps more important, is variation due to self-movement.
We move our heads; we move about our surroundings. As we do so, the
strength and direction of the signals received from various stimuli changes.
The various stimuli can be mapped from these changes. But this requires pro-
prioceptive information about one’s own movement and information about
timing. So, the important question whether hearing and smell yield spatial
mappings turns on how we integrate these inputs.
Cross-modal Binding You hear sounds; you see objects. You also hear
sounds as coming from objects. For example, when listening to an orchestral
performance, you might hear a flute someway off to the left of the ensemble.
But then you pick out the flautist and see her head bob as she plays her instru-
ment. Suddenly, the sound of the flute is heard coming from a much more
confined location than it did before. It doesn’t come merely from the left; it
comes from the flautist. (Compare the ventriloquist illusion.)
What is the ontology of this phenomenon? Is there unified audio-visual per-
ception of objects producing sounds?
Emergent Qualities. Sense qualities that have traditionally been treated as
simple turn out in many cases to be mixtures that have some degree of phe-
nomenological unity. Colour is a prime example of this. Philosophers in the
atomist tradition take colour to be a prime example of a simple idea. Yet it
was known even to Aristotle that colour is a composite appearance. Today, it
is commonplace to analyse perceived colour into three intensive components
that can vary more or less independently — values along blue-yellow, red-
green, and black-white dimensions. Burnt sienna is a unitary colour, but it can
perceptually (not physically) be resolved into strong components of red and
black, together with a weak admixture of yellow. Qualities in other modalities
are also analysable, though less systematically. (The orderly three dimension-
ality of colour is an exception.) Smell, for example, is a unitary quality that
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arises cumulatively from multiple olfactory receptors. A single complex odor-
iferous substance like cheese might excite dozens of receptors. Yet, it has a
unified odour; it is one odour, not a collection of odours existing side by side.
Multisensory emergence is a particularly interesting case. Here are two
examples.
(i) Solidity. When you hold a hard object between your fingers — a fork
or knife or pen — it feels solid. How is this feeling of solidity different from
what you would feel if outward pressure was separately applied to the corre-
sponding parts of your hand? — For in the latter case, you feel disconnected
points of pressure, not solidity. The answer is that you feel counter-acting and
reciprocal pressure when you hold something — you push down on a pen with
your middle and index fingers to steady it against the resistance of the writing
surface, and then the thumb must provide compensating force to stop the pen
from being pushed down. This interplay between the fingers that grip the pen
are responsible for the feeling of solidity — but you are aware of the interplay
not by touch but by proprioception. The feeling of solidity, seemingly simple,
arises, in short, from the interplay of touch and proprioception.
(ii) Flavour. The taste buds in the tongue provide only limited information
about flavour. More information is provided by vapours from the oral cavity
rising over smell receptors — a sensory process called ‘retronasal’ olfaction
to mark the entry to smell from the mouth instead of the nose. Information
is also provided by the trigeminal nerves in the face which are affected by
irritants like mustard and stimulants like the fizz in soda. A single flavour
emerges out of all of these influences. The taste of a fizzy drink arises then
from an interplay of taste-buds, olfactory receptors, and pain receptors. But
what we experience is unified — it is one flavour. Should we regard this single
flavour as multisensory? We are inclined to think that this is a problem even
for sensory atomists.
Several of these questions, and many others, are addressed by the papers
in this volume. The notion that much of perceptual experience is multisen-
sory is accepted by all parties involved; at the same time, the claim that
much of perceptual experience is multisensory assumes a distinction between
several individual senses, such that some experiences employ a combination
of these senses, while other experiences may be unisensory. Yet the chal-
lenge of finding appropriate criteria for individuating the senses has not been
resolved. Individuating the senses by phenomenology alone reintroduces the
initial problems that plagued the atomists. Phenomenology seems to play some
essential role in sense individuation, but the question of its more precise role
remains. Several papers in this volume address the question of sense individu-
ation, as we will explain below.
Our common notion of sense assumes that there are several distinct senses,
independent from one another while working in concert with each other. But
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the prevalence of multisensory perception in conscious experience threatens
this ordinary notion of the senses as distinct and independent and puts pressure
on the intuitively defined boundaries of individual sensory modalities. Taking
on an issue similar to that addressed by Garzorz and Deroy (this volume),
Casey O’Callaghan resolves the tension between our intuitive notion of sense
and the phenomenon of multisensory perception with an account of the senses
as capacities. ‘What each sense shares and what differentiates one sense from
another’, he writes, ‘is the manner in which those capacities are exercised.
Each way of perceiving involves a distinct type of information gathering, indi-
viduated by the information it functions to extract and the medium from which
it does so’.
O’Callaghan’s approach allows us to distinguish between unisensory capac-
ities, multisensory capacities (those that can be deployed in a way that relies
on more than one sensory manner), and distinctively multisensory capaci-
ties. The last of these are capacities that cannot be exercised originally by
a single sensory manner. Flavor and balance perception are the examples
of distinctly multisensory features, which employ distinctively multisensory
capacities. The same theory of sense can be used to draw parallel distinctions
in the domain of perceptual episodes, thus providing a single principled of
both the nature of sense as well as unisensory and multisensory perceptual
phenomena. O’Callaghan’s account also provides us with answers to certain
hard cases regarding the senses, including how to understand the individuation
of visual sense for Grice’s four-eyed creature.
In ‘Why There Is a Vestibular Sense, or How Metacognition Individuates
the Senses’, Garzorz and Deroy ask whether the vestibular system should be
counted as a sense. The question is similar to O’Callaghan (this volume); Gar-
zorz and Deroy offer criteria for identifying a distinct sense that goes beyond
the connection between a sense and the utilization of particular organs. Their
proposal for individuating senses adds a metacognitive criterion- they argue
that subjects have the capacity to monitor information generated by distinct
organs, whether that information is unisensory or integrated multisensorily.
This capacity, they claim, can be exhibited and measured by performance on
specific metacognitive tasks.
Their proposal is worked out in detail for the vestibular system, and tak-
ing this as their model, Garzorz and Deroy offer metacognitive awareness of
information generated by particular sense organs as a novel criterion for sense-
individuation in general. The addition of an explicitly metacognitive criterion
would establish personal criteria in addition to physiological criteria for indi-
viduating senses, in a way that Garzorz and Deroy claim would accurately
reflect the contribution that each sense makes to how we experience the world
at the subjective level.
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In the popular imagination, synesthesia may be one of the most iconic
forms of multisensory perception. While synesthesia encompasses a diverse
array of phenomena, broadly speaking all forms of synesthesia are perceptual
or sensory episodes in one modality (or cognitive stream) which have been
triggered by stimulation of a different modality (or without sensory stimula-
tion entirely). In ‘Synesthesia as (Multimodal) Mental Imagery’, Bence Nanay
defends the claim that all synesthesia is a kind of mental imagery, includ-
ing synesthesia not induced by sensory stimulation. This appears to conflict
with several popular accounts of synesthesia- in particular, those that treat
synesthesia as distinct from mental imagery. Nanay’s proposal avoids this con-
flict by treating mental imagery as an especially broad category, one which
includes all early perceptual processing not triggered by corresponding sen-
sory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. This allows mental imagery to
be conscious or unconscious, voluntary or non-voluntary, and to have a variety
of subjectively experienced qualities.
Treating all instances of synesthesia as forms of mental imagery (so
defined) is consistent with recent evidence of artificially induced synesthe-
sia, and illuminates significant similarities between synesthetic ‘projectors’
and ‘associators’. It can account for multimodal and unimodal synesthesia, as
well as sensory substitution and synesthetic events that occur in the absence
of sensory stimulation whatsoever.
While Nanay’s theory allows for sensory substitution to be interpreted as
a form of synesthesia, in ‘Mixing up the Senses: Sensory Substitution Is Not
a Form of Artificially Induced Synaesthesia’, Kirsch, Job, and Auvray ask
whether sensory substitution experiences sufficiently fulfill the criteria for
synesthetic episodes, in particular artificial synesthetic experiences. Focusing
on criteria such as specific inducer–concurrent pairings and their idiosyncrasy,
as well as automaticity and consistency over time, Kirsch et al. significantly
narrow the range of experiences that qualify as synesthetic. While Nanay takes
synesthetic experiences to be sensory episodes in one modality which have
been triggered by stimulation of a different modality, Kirsch et al. have more
stringent criteria.
Sensory Substitution Devices operate in a variety of ways, and research into
the phenomenology of the sensory experiences produced by SSDs has not yet
revealed uniform experiences across subjects. In particular, the phenomenol-
ogy of SSD use reported by sighted and non-sighted subjects is significantly
different in each case. Though some SSD subjects report a phenomenology
that is consistent with the criteria for synesthesia (per Kirsch et al.), the evi-
dence does not show that the criteria are met in other cases. The dissimilarities
between sensory substitution and synesthesia, in regards to the essential cri-
teria Krisch et al. propose, make a compelling case that sensory substitution
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should not be treated as an artificially induced form of synesthesia, despite
promising first appearances.
In ‘Visual Self-Motion Feedback Affects the Sense of Self in Virtual Real-
ity’ Schettler et al. investigate the impact of perceived motion in virtual reality
avatars on a subjects’ sense of self-identification with those avatars. Evi-
dence from their study suggests that observing corresponding (rather than
incongruent) motion in avatars creates a more significant phenomenology of
self-identification than several other types of correspondence, in particular
congruent representations of biological sex in an avatar.
The ability to interpret an alien body as an extension of one’s self based on
visual feedback has been utilized for decades in Mirror-Box therapy for pain
in phantom limbs and other forms of chronic regional pain. More recently,
researchers have explored whether particular perceived motions in virtual real-
ity avatars will also serve as an effective treatment for these types of pain.
The study by Schettler et al. examines the extent to which congruence in per-
ceived motion between an individual and an avatar overrides other types of
incongruence. They take their results to suggest that the strength of the influ-
ence of perceived congruent motion over other self-identification factors (here,
identification with biological sex), show that certain bottom-up feedback may
override top-down interpretations of self-representation.
In ‘The Role of Attention in Multisensory Integration’ Christopher Mole
examines an apparent paradox concerning the relationship between attention
and multisensory integration that has puzzled the multisensory research com-
munity for the past several years. In the very same experiments, data seem
to show that integration occurs prior to and affects attention (when analyzed
according to one method), and that attention occurs prior to and affects integra-
tion (when analyzed according to a different method). Neither interpretation
of the data seems more appropriate than the other, and yet they seem to be at
odds with each other.
Mole’s solution to this puzzle involves reconsidering how we interpret the
events studied in these experiments; the event of attending to a stimulus and
the event of integrating multisensory information. The paradox, according to
Mole, arises only if we understand these events has having naturally fixed
end-points; as terminating when a selection is made or a button is pushed.
Mole suggests that ‘this appearance of paradox can be removed if we can find
a way to resist the idea that there must be fixed temporal relations between
the instances of these processes.’ Attending and integrating are process that
could continue indefinitely, and the point at which we consider them com-
pleted is artificially imposed on them- an artifact of the studies themselves.
Understanding the different metaphysics of different types of events allows us
to resolve this paradox without fundamentally revising our concepts of atten-
tion or multisensory integration.
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Note
1. Not all philosophers endorse the association between atomic ideas and
simple experience. The great positivist, Rudolf Carnap, tried to ‘construct’
simple ideas out of temporally extended, all-inclusive streams of con-
sciousness, or ‘elementary experiences,’ as he called them. The system
of his Aufbau maps on to that of sensory atomism in interesting ways.
But he apparently didn’t take the priority of ‘elementary experiences’ to
be ontologically fundamental feature of his system, and in the Preface to
the Second Edition, he signals a preference for Mach’s rigidly atomistic
system. ‘It is certainly interesting that the restriction to a single basic con-
cept is possible,’ he writes. ‘However, nowadays this procedure appears
to me to be too artificial.’ (We are grateful to Jennifer Nagel for helpful
discussion of Carnap.)
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